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1. Introduction 
During the 1970’s, the Western world started to promote the human rights agenda in the 
international community. When Jimmy Carter became the president of the United States of 
America in 1976, the issue of human rights became a high priority of US foreign policy, 
laying out a path for the rest of the Western world. However, it was only a decade later that 
the issue of human rights was brought to the fore of the foreign aid agenda (Stokke, 1995. 
p.21). In the 1990’s, the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation started to 
focus on the promotion of human rights. During this time, political conditionality made its 
first major appearance. Political conditionality “entails the linking of perceived benefits to 
another state to the fulfillment of conditions relating to the protection of human rights and the 
advancement of democratic principles” (Smith, 1998. p.256). Although aid conditionality had 
already been used by some Bretton Woods institutions, this conditionality was mainly focused 
on economic-stabilization. In the 1990’s, aid conditionality was no longer restricted to 
economic purposes but spread to political liberalization, good governance, and human rights 
(Baehr, 1995. p.57). 
Ever since the end of the Cold War, political conditionality used by the European 
community and now the European Union was, and still is, explicitly focused on the 
establishment of a democratic political regime and the protection of human rights (Smith, 
1998. p.253; Dellepiane, Molenaers & Faust, 2015. p.2). Conditionality was the main tool 
used for sanctioning violations of human rights and for the implementation of the ‘good 
governance’ agenda. Using diplomatic instruments, such as political conditionality, the EU 
has tried to improve the human rights situation in many developing countries, especially in 
Africa. Over the years, the effectiveness of political conditionality has been questioned by 
many researchers (Crawford, 1997; Adam & Gunning, 2002; Fisher, 2015). Concerns have 
been raised about the new aid flows and the new ‘ownership’ role of the donor countries. Has 
political conditionality actually helped to advance human right situations in different countries 
or did other factors led to positive reforms. Is political conditionality as effective as EU 
countries claim?  
This thesis will try to analyze to what extent political conditionality helps advance the 
implementation of EU human rights policies in Kenya and Uganda? This question will be 
answered by analyzing and conducting a comparative case study. As political conditionality is 
used differently in almost every country, a comparative case study will illuminate the 
differences in the way political conditionality is used. A comparative case study will, 
therefore, provide additional information to the already existing research on political 
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conditionality. Both Kenya and Uganda have a colonial history with an EU country and are 
located in the same area, making them geographically similar. However, the EU used political 
conditionality in two very different ways in those countries. The EU has always been very 
strict towards Kenya and quite lenient towards Uganda. The different policies might give a 
clearer view on the way political conditionality is used and which is more effective.  
In the first chapter concepts surrounding political conditionality will be laid out. The second 
chapter analyses the situation in Kenya and the third chapter analyses the situation in Uganda. 
Afterwards three criteria of political conditionality will be presented and finally a conclusion 
will be made. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
In the 1980’s the Western world concluded that democracy and the protection of human rights 
were key to development policies and incorporate these elements in their foreign policies. 
Western countries believed that for a country to obtain economic development, a certain level 
of ‘good governance’ has to be in place (Leftwich, 2000. pp.72-73). Through the rest of the 
1980’s and 1990’s, the improvement of human rights in developing countries, became a main 
goal in EU development policies. During this time, ‘good governance’ became a key term. It 
was used mostly for the promotion of human rights and democracy through the introduction 
of multi-party elections (van Cranenburgh, 1995. p.41). 
Over the years, many efforts have been made to conceptualize the idea of human rights. 
In essence, human rights are rights believed to be universal and inherent to every human 
being. The United Nations General Assembly tried to codify these rights in the UDHR: 
 “Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, 
place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, language, or any other 
status. Both civil and political rights, such as the right to life, equality before the law and 
freedom of expression; economic, social and cultural rights, such as the rights to work, social 
security and education, or collective rights, such as the rights to development and self-
determination, are indivisible, interrelated and interdependent” (UDHR, 1948). 
Three ‘generations’ of human rights are distinguished. The first generation is civil and 
political rights, also called the ‘classic’ human rights. The second generation contains the 
social, economic and cultural rights and the third generation refers to collective rights (Baehr, 
1999. p.6). In the past, social and economic rights were often seen as a priority, as 
improvement of social and economic conditions would significantly help to reduce poverty 
and stimulate development. Stokke (1995. pp.7-9) calls this the first generation of 
conditionality. The first generation was triggered by the Third World’s economic crisis of the 
late 1970’s and is focused on economic policy reform. In 1996, the United States stated that 
social and economic rights did not belong in the same category as the ‘classic’ human rights, 
as these rights could be guaranteed, whereas the protection of social and economic rights 
depended on the individual circumstances per country (Baehr, 1999. p.33). It was the Soviet 
Union that claimed that social and economic rights were essential for the fulfillment of civil 
and political rights (Baehr, 1999. p.32). Nowadays, it is believed that classical rights and 
social economic rights are inseparable and democratic governments’ plea for the protection of 
all ‘generations’ of human rights. When the Cold War ended, the second generation of 
conditionality was triggered, giving a new emphasis to political reform as a condition for 
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development aid (Stokke, 1995. p.10). The dominant interest was no longer the promotion of 
socio-economic rights, but had shifted towards the distribution of Western political norms and 
ideals, and civil and political rights became a priority in the foreign aid policies of Western 
donor states (Stokke, 1995. pp.21-24). Human rights were regarded as a tool for the protection 
of the individual against the abuse of power by either authorities or other people (Baehr, 1999. 
p.42).  
At the Luxembourg European Council meeting, a ‘Declaration of Human Rights’ was 
formulated, which entailed the first step for the EU towards actively promoting human rights 
in economic trading agreements. With this declaration, the EU cleared a legal path for the use 
of conditionality (Faia, 2010. p.104). This path was continued in 1989 with the Lomé IV 
convention, where the EU conceptualized the promotion of human rights as a part of their 
development policy regarding Africa, and justified the use of conditionality as a basis for aid 
(Lister, 1997). Article 96/97 of the Lomé convention made it legal for the EU to suspend aid 
towards developing countries that were violating human rights (Lomé convention, 1898). 
Political conditionality in all these declarations and conventions, and in foreign aid overall, 
concerned the first generation of human rights. Therefore, these rights are the main focus of 
this paper.  
With political conditionality as a tool, the Western world, and the EU in particular, 
started to spread the good governance agenda. The basic idea of conditionality is that one 
actor aims to change the behavior of another actor and might help persuade a recipient 
government to behave in certain ways (Koch, 2015. p.99). Koch explains that the use of 
political conditionality is a direct influence on the rational cost-benefit calculation of a state. 
As conditionality changes the cost-benefit calculation of a country directly, by raising the cost 
or adding benefits, it differs from socialization, where no specific incentives are offered to 
change a state’s behavior (Koch, 2015. p.98). Therefore, the goal of conditionality is changing 
the behavior of a state.  
To analyze if political conditionality helps advance the implementation of EU human 
rights policies, it is important to distinguish all the different ways political conditionality is 
used. Two distinctions can be made within conditionality. The first is between negative and 
positive conditionality. Negative conditionality focuses on punishing or restricting a state 
through conditions, while positive conditionality focuses on rewarding a state through 
conditions (Koch, 2015. p.99). Conditionality basically follows ‘the carrot and the stick’ 
approach. When adopting negative conditionality policies, the EU uses ‘the stick’ to push 
developing countries to implement democratic reforms. When adopting positive 
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conditionality policies, the EU uses ‘the carrot’ to tempt countries to implement democratic 
reforms (van Cranenburgh, 1995. p.45). 
Within positive and negative conditionality, two other forms can be distinguished: ex-
ante and ex-post conditionality. Ex-ante conditionality refers to “conditions that need to be 
fulfilled before entering into a relationship, a specific form of cooperation or before reaping 
the benefits of a beneficial agreement” (Koch, 2015. p.99). An example of ex-ante 
conditionality is the 1993 Copenhagen criteria
1
 (Tocci, 2007. p.11). Ex-post conditionality, on 
the other hand, refers to “conditions that are set during the course of an ongoing relationship” 
(Koch, 2015. p.99). An example of ex-post conditionality is the human rights clause in the EU 
association agreements
2
 (Tocci, 2007. p.11). 
In negative conditionality, conditions are tied to development aid and if the conditions 
are not met, the aid can be reduced or terminated (Smith, 1998. p.256). The basic idea of 
negative conditionality is to punish a country when it does not meet the set conditions. Aid to 
governments that violate human rights will be reduced or withheld (van Cranenburgh, 1995. 
p.46). When using ex-ante negative conditionality, a donor country will reduce existing 
benefits before entering into a new agreement with a recipient country (Koch, 2015. p.99). 
This means that a country will have to co-operate or face negative repercussions. Ex-ante 
negative conditionality can be used to create an incentive for a recipient state to enter a new 
agreement and comply with certain conditions. The use of ex-ante negative conditionality is 
not officially established in EU foreign policy. It may be used in negotiations and informal 
agreements, but has almost never been a part of a formal agreement between the EU and a 
recipient state (Koch, 2015. p.101). The only time it was officially used was in 2003, when 
the EU put a visa ban on the Transnistrian leadership to ensure their cooperation (Tocci, 2007. 
p.11). Ex-post negative conditionality refers to the reduction or suspension of aid when the 
recipient country does not meet the set conditions of a relationship or an agreement that is 
already in place. They are “sanctions in response to violations of peace, human rights, the rule 
of law and democracy” (Tocci, 2007. p.11). Punishments are used when there is a clear breach 
of ‘the object and purpose’ of an agreement (Tocci, 2007. p.12). Western donor countries are 
no longer the only major actors in the international community. Non-Western governments, 
                                                            
1 The Copenhagen criteria are accession criteria and “contain  the essential conditions all candidate countries must satisfy to 
become a EU member state” (European Commission ). This includes political and economic criteria, and administrative and 
institutional capacity. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en 
2 “An association agreement is a bilateral agreement between the EU and a third country. In the context of accession to the 
EU, it serves as the basis for implementation of the accession process. Turkey currently has an association agreement. 
Association agreements between the Western Balkan countries and the EU and its Member States are called 'stabilization 
and association agreements'”(European Commission). https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/association-agreement_en 
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such as China, offer economic and development aid and forms of private aid, providing 
recipient countries with alternative choices (Büthe, Major & Souza, 2012. p.574). Countries 
have the option to search for the needed aid somewhere else and are not obligated to give in to 
Western conditions that might not align with their own agenda. This was the case in Indonesia 
in 1992. 
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Political conditionality can also be used in a positive way to reward countries by 
promising benefits when they fulfill conditions (Smith, 1998. p.256; Tocci, 2007. p.10). This 
type of conditionality has no repercussions when conditions are not met, but only creates an 
incentive to implement changes. Also, in positive conditionality, a distinction can be made 
between ex-ante and ex-post positive conditionality. 
Ex-ante positive conditionality is perceived as the ‘authentic’ version of conditionality 
(Koch, 2015. p.99). Before an agreement is made, certain conditions are imposed. If a country 
transforms accordingly, they will receive benefits, mostly additional aid, in return. Tocci 
(2007. p.12) describes this as ‘gatekeeping’; the EU will only give the green light for the 
agreement if a developing country’s transformation meets the pre-conditions. The best-known 
example of ex-ante positive conditionality is EU membership. Before countries can enter into 
an agreement with the EU and receive the benefits of EU membership in return, they need to 
implement the set criteria. This type of conditionality is mostly used to create aid, trade or 
membership selectivity (Koch, 2015. p.99). Ex-post positive conditionality, on the other hand, 
connects the level of improvement and performance of a state with the amount of aid received. 
When applying ex-post positive conditionality, a constant assessment of the improvement of 
the recipient state by the donor state will take place and the amount of aid will be adapted 
based on the results of each assessment (Koch, 2015. p.99). Ex-post conditionality is a 
process of benchmarking and monitoring. Based on annual reports, the development of the 
recipient country is assessed. When this development is positive, additional benefits will be 
provided (Tocci, 2007.p.12). This type of positive conditionality is widely used in EU foreign 
policies, as the EU uses it to make implementation of human rights very attractive for 
countries.  
                                                            
3
 The Netherlands was one of the biggest additional aid donors for Indonesia. After a period of many human rights violations, Jan 
Pronk decided in 1990 to withdraw 27 million guilders of additional aid for Indonesia. It was only in 1992, that the Netherlands expressed its 
willingness to resume its aid program, however, this aid was tied to many conditions. One of the conditions was that if Indonesia would not 
produce satisfactory results, there would be consequences not only from the Dutch but from their European partners as well (Baehr, 1999. 
p.92). In contrast to what the Dutch government expected, their threat did not lead to the Indonesian government complying with their 
request. Instead, the Indonesian government searched for new donor countries to become independent of the Netherlands and succeeded in 
doing so. As a result, the Dutch no longer possessed the power to improve any form of human rights in the country.  
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Both negative and positive conditionality provide incentives for recipient countries to 
change their internal political structure and human rights policies. Different forms of political 
conditionality have different effects. The example of Indonesia, proved that too much 
pressure via negative conditionality might have the opposite result. It is essential to analyze 
the cases of Kenya and Uganda with these distinctions in mind. What type of conditionality is 
more effective for the advancement of the implementation of EU human rights policies?  
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3. Kenya 
1990-1992 
In the 1990’s, Western donors used political conditionality as a tool to force political change 
in Kenya. Throughout 1990 and 1991, President Daniel arap Moi and his one-party state 
received more and more criticism domestically and internationally. These years were 
characterized by suppression of speech and association rights. Detentions and political trials, 
torture, arbitrary arrests and police brutality were common features of Moi’s rule (Adar & 
Munyae, 2001. p.6). Between 1989 and 1991, Amnesty International released multiple 
documents showing how people who advocated for multiparty elections were detained 
without charge and tortured (Amnesty International, 1990). During this time, foreign aid 
constituted almost 86 percent of the Kenyan government’s development budget. The 
country’s dependence on foreign aid provided the Western donors with the power to exert 
pressure to improve the human rights situation in Kenya. This exertion of pressure resulted in 
the Kenya Consultative Group (CG) meeting in November 1991. The donors reduced the total 
aid to Kenya by about 350 million dollars until the country instituted a multi-party system and 
reduced the incidences of human rights violations (Grosh & Orvis, 1996. p.50). Only a couple 
days later, President Moi announced that the one-party system would be abolished and multi-
party elections would be held. This was a positive outcome of political conditionality used by 
Western donors. However, just prior to the election, constitutional amendments were made to 
ensure the victory of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and President Moi (Brown, 
2001. pp.726-727). With every legal component of the one-party regime still in place, 
President Moi and the KANU had total control of the election and freedom of speech, 
freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly were still not a part of the human rights 
system in Kenya (Waller, 1995. p.119). This caused a lot of dissent among the Kenyan people. 
Not only were many opposition candidates prevented from presenting their official 
registration papers, but members of ethnic groups associated with opposition parties also were 
physically attacked, resulting in the death of over 1500 people (Brown, 2001. p.727). 
Although donor states heard about these events, they decided not to act on them. After the 
1992 elections, pressure from donors to establish political reform was reduced and shifted to 
promoting economic reforms to ensure stability. 
 
1993-1997 
In 1993, the German government restarted negotiations with Kenya concerning further aid to 
continue improving the human rights situation. Based on a new “country concept”, 
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Länderkonzept, Germany pursued a strategy that combined macro-conditionality and direct 
positive measures (Waller, 1995. p.120). Germany would not further reduce its aid, but would 
reward Kenya with an increase in aid if democratic reforms were enacted. However, the 
German government soon discovered that if the government in question was reluctant to 
implement reforms, the use of political conditionality alone was not enough to ensure change 
(Waller, 1995. p.126). It was important to try and change the society from within. The 
government’s power had to be reduced and a civil society had to be formed. Germany tried to 
encourage decentralization and tied capital aid project to conditions, which contained 
essential elements for the creation of independent organizations and were aimed at greater 
independence of local administrations. This can be called project conditionality (Waller, 1995. 
p.120). With project conditionality, the German government started channeling external 
resources into local communities and organizations to form civil society organizations (CVO) 
and NGOs (Little, 2014. p.103). In this case, Germany adopted a policy of ex-post positive 
conditionality; the German government assessed the improvements of their project aid and 
would provide more aid if the results were positive. 
In 1993 and 1994, Germany and other EU donors rewarded Kenya’s ‘achievements’ 
with more aid allocation, even though there was enough evidence to prove that these 
achievements were insufficient. Although they implemented a series of by-elections, 
President Moi and the Kenyan government were clearly still violating human rights. In 1995, 
Britain had enough. The British government refused to approve any new aid projects until 
proper reforms were made to ensure the improvement of human rights (Brown, 2007. p.315).  
 
1997 
In 1997, another set of multi-party elections took place. Similar to the elections of 
1992, these elections saw a wave of violence towards ethnic opposition groups; between 
10.000 and 200.000 people were threatened and around 100 people were killed. Also, the 
1992 constitutional reforms were still in place, giving opposition parties almost no 
opportunity to win (Adar & Munyae, 2001. p.11). The opposition, therefore, called for a 
constitutional reform and founded the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC). The 
NCEC demanded constitutional reforms or threatened to boycott the elections. This led to a 
string of excessive (police) violence towards the NCEC and resulted in violent deaths. The 
attack on pro-democracy demonstrators shocked the donors and, at the end of 1997, Western 
donors suspended almost 400 million dollars of aid, demanding the fair treatment of the 
opposition (Bigg, 1997; Brown, 2001 p.733). However, the pressure from donors soon came 
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to an end. Minimal adaptations and reforms were promised, ensuring the continuation of the 
elections (Ajulu, 1998. p.277). Donors saw the election as an essential part of the 
democratization process. Donors even threatened to cut off NCECs funding if they did not go 
along with the ‘old-fashioned compromise’ to ensure the continuation of the election (Brown, 
2001 p.733). As expected by the opposition, President Moi found a way to avoid 
implementing the promised reforms before the elections, again ensuring his own success. 
After the elections, it was clear that they had been rigged and opposition parties demanded a 
re-run (Ajulu, 1998. p.278). Multiple donors, and especially the EU, raised questions about 
the validity of the election, but concluded that the 1997 elections had been more democratic 
than those of 1992 and were, therefore, “a step in the right direction” (Brown, 2001. p.734). 
 
1998-2002 
During the period of 1998-2002, President Moi implemented only minimal reforms to 
satisfy the donors. Moi discovered that donors were reluctant to reduce and suspend aid, as 
they were afraid to destabilize the economy. The (economic) stability of the state was more 
important than human rights violations (Brown, 2007. p.317). According to a Ugandan 
observer, it was this belief that caused Western countries to support dictatorships in African 
countries, such as Uganda and Kenya (Sorensen, 1995. p.392). In 1999, the EU donors 
became divided. The Netherlands canceled its 25 million a year aid program to express its 
dissatisfaction with the pace of the constitutional reform process and the German government 
re-evaluated three projects that they were funding (Brown, 2007. p.318). However, other EU 
donors feared that reducing aid would escalate the political situation, resulting in political 
instability. Therefore, the EU, together with the US, pressured the IMF to resume aid and 
release new funds. A long list of conditions and measures was connected to the new aid 
(Brown, 2007. p.318). The EU tried to use the promise of benefits and more aid, ex-ante 
positive conditionality, as a tool to improve the human rights situation in Kenya. 
  
2002-Present 
Major reforms only took place in 2002, when the 10-year term limit of President Moi 
was reached and the regime changed. The United States had met with president Moi and 
encouraged him to retire and hold fair elections (Barkan, 2004. p.90). The elections were won 
by Mwai Kibaki, who was the leader of the National Rainbow Coalition. The elections of 
2002 were considered to be substantially fairer than those of 1992 and 1997. Although 
violence, voter intimidation and opposition oppression still took place, the degree in which 
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they did had reduced enormously (Anderson, 2003. p.338). After 2002, the first steps towards 
constitutional reform were put in place. The Kenyan Constitutional Reform Commission 
(CRC) was formed with the aim of reforming the constitutional changes made in the 1990’s. 
More than 500 delegates attended the CRC meetings, representing almost all ethnic groups in 
Kenya. Minority groups saw their chance to mobilize and entered the political field as new 
political actors, basing their campaigns on the international human rights legislation (Little, 
2014. p.98). After two years a new constitutional document was produced, which included 
improvement of the rights of ethnic minorities. In 2004, the document was sent to Parliament, 
but almost all the recommendations and wishes of the minorities were ignored. This led to 
rejection of the document during the national referendum in 2005. The international 
community viewed the rejection of the national referendum as a sign of democratic progress 
and had a positive attitude towards the 2007 election (Del Biondo, 2011. p.385). Although the 
expectations were positive, the actual results were not. Del Biondo (2011. p.385) shows that 
the EU did not implement sanctions even after realizing “that the 2007 General Elections fell 
short of key international and regional standards for democratic elections”. 
In August of this year, new elections should take place in Kenya, however, “Kenyan 
authorities consistently fail to adequately investigate a range of abuses across the country and 
undermine basic rights to freedom of expression and association” (Human Rights Watch, 
2017). 
 
Effects 
In the 1990’s Kenya was in need of serious reform, but the Kenyan government was 
reluctant. The EU, therefore, saw no other option than to exert pressure for changes by 
reducing aid. The short-term results of this pressure were the establishment of a multi-party 
system and free elections. Although the human right situation in 1992 was considerably better 
than the pre-1991 situation, there was still a continuation of the authoritarian regime (Waller, 
1995. p.119). Without legal improvements, the multi-party system was only an illusion. The 
constitution ensured the continuation of the one-party state, as it suppressed any chance of a 
real opposition. The continuation of the authoritarian regime was made possible because of 
the support of Western donors. The donors forced the opposition (NCEC) to enter the election 
of 1997, even if this meant that essential constitutional reforms would not take place. The 
Kenyan government used development funds to suppress her opponents and ensure their own 
success (Grosh & Orvis, 1996. p.53).  President Moi had always kept the donors satisfied with 
small democratic reforms, but had also made sure these reforms always ensured and 
13 
 
supported his rule. Before the 1992 elections donor forced the opposition to participate in the 
elections even when donors knew the opposition had no chance at winning. Donors believed 
“it was better to lose and be represented in parliament than not be represented at all” (Brown, 
2001. p.731). The same happened in 1997. If the donors had not supported Moi’s rule and did 
not force the opposition to comprise, the opposition parties would have been able to exert 
more pressure and enforce constitutional reform. KANU knew as long as any form of election 
was held the donors would be happy and would not suspend their aid. KANU also knew that 
the donors would help them force the opposition to participate in the election, even if this 
meant there would be no constitutional reforms. Therefore, it can be said that pressure exerted 
by donors also had negative long-term effects. 
However, the Western donors also helped to clear the way for opposition parties and 
civil society activists. Therefore, the formation of a civil society by the establishment of 
opposition parties and NGOs can be considered as a positive long-term effect of the enforced 
reforms by Western donors. Donors aided NGOs, which helped establish a social dialogue, 
called for the improvement of human rights and eventually encouraged the constitutional 
reforms in 2005 (Sjörgen, Murung’a & Okello, 2014, pp. 30-31).  
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4. Uganda 
The first time European countries used negative political conditionality was in 1977 in 
Uganda. After a brutal massacre by the government, the countries withdrew their 
development aid, as they would not contribute to the violations of human rights (Bartels, 2008. 
p.2). However, after the regime changed in 1986, the EU resumed development aid, 
seemingly only using aid as a reward for positive changes, i.e., positive conditionality. 
In the Western world, Uganda is seen as one of the major success stories of Africa and 
is even described by some as a showcase for conditionality (Adam & Gunning, 2002. p.2046). 
In practice, however, political conditionality was used to a very limited degree. After two 
dictators, a long period of civil war, and economic decline, the National Resistance Army 
(NRA) came to power via an armed struggle. The NRA re-established itself as the National 
Resistance Movement (NRM) in 1986 and Yoweri Museveni became the new President of 
Uganda. Instead of continuing the authoritarian structure of his predecessors, Museveni 
claimed democratic reform and liberalization as two of his main priorities (Mandabi, 1988, 
p.1173). Museveni himself put effort in securing civil and political rights, such as freedom of 
speech and association, which pleased the EU donors. Also, the Ugandan government was 
willing to work with donor countries and consider proposed reforms. Due to the openness of 
the NRM and Museveni, Western donors did not think it necessary to influence Uganda by 
sanctions and reducing aid, like they did in Kenya (Hauser, 1997. p.195). Instead, they started 
giving aid and promised more assistance to encourage Museveni to continue his reforms. 
However, the transition of power was not as peaceful as Museveni made it seem. The NRM 
encountered a major difficulty during its rule: Uganda’s ethnic political context. The 
unification of Southern tribes was perceived as a form of ethnic exclusion by the Northern 
tribes. Moreover, before 1986, the NRA had used violence in the Northern part of Uganda to 
secure their rule (Branch, 2011. p.64). Museveni wanted to unify Uganda and reduce the 
ethnic political fragmentation. He created a political movement system, which allowed all 
Ugandans to take part in the political debate and permitted the establishment of opposition 
parties. Although opposition parties were allowed to exist, all were severely restricted in their 
activities. The only reason why parties were allowed to exist as independent entities was 
because the NRM believed this would help avoid exacerbating political opposition (Carbone, 
2003. p.486). Uganda’s political system was still closest to a hegemonic party system, as the 
NRM party had no real competition. However, some donors believed that the permission of 
opposition parties would become the basis for an actual Uganda electoral democracy 
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(Carbone, 2003. p.487). This is why “donors had been convinced that a no-party democracy is 
a good system” (Dijkstra, 2002. p.328).  
The political movement system also included the establishment of resistance councils 
(RC) in every village in Uganda, creating a seemingly democratic local government (Makara, 
Rakner & Svåsand, 2009. p.187). This, paired with the hope of establishing a real electoral 
democracy, was enough to satisfy the donors and gave them a valid reason to continue their 
aid. Between 1987 and 1992, aid given to Uganda by Western donors was rarely accompanied 
by sanctions (Dijkstra & Donge, 2001. p.842). Museveni and the NRM had implemented 
democratic elements, reformed the economy, and stabilized the political situation. Donors 
considered Uganda to be a model for development for other African states when it came to 
economic reform and cooperation with donors (Branch, 2011. pp.80-81). If they would reduce 
aid to Uganda, the donors risked damaging the country’s reputation and indirectly “put the 
efficacy of their own policies into doubt” (Branch, 2011. p.82). The Ugandan government 
soon discovered that as long as they showed interest in implementing reforms, Western 
donors were easily satisfied. Since 1992, Museveni has publicly committed himself to 
democratic reforms and created structural adjustment programs (Dijkstra & Donge, 2001. 
p.845). 
Western donors only started to really exert pressure in 1994, when they financed the 
constitutional debates. The donors’ promise to fund the Constitutional Assembly was paired 
with a list of conditions. If the NRM wanted to receive more aid for Uganda, they had to 
finish the draft constitution, pass the election bill, and put no restrictions on the opposition 
parties (Hauser, 1997. p.211). Meeting conditions before entering an agreement to receive 
benefits is a form of ex-ante positive conditionality. Not all conditions were met; parties were 
still not permitted to participate in the elections and opposition candidates were restricted in 
all their political activities (Kasfir, 1998. p.62). Still, Western donors considered the elections 
to be an improvement of civil and political rights. Therefore, aid was again continued and 
Uganda was provided with the promised benefits. 
In 2000, a national referendum pointed out that the people of Uganda craved the 
reintroduction of a multiparty system. However, Museveni’s opinion was that in developing 
societies such as Uganda, a multiparty system would only support social cleavages and 
undermine development (Makara et al. 2009. p.189). As multiparty elections were not a 
condition set by Western donors, the government of Uganda easily dismissed the idea. It was 
not until 2003, with the appointment of the Constitutional Review Commission (CVR), that 
the formation of a multiparty system began. As a result of the recommendations of the CVR, 
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the constitutional bill of 1995 was revisited in 2005 (Makara et al., 2009. p.195). Even though 
the results of the referendum were in favor of the return of multiparty politics, it was decided 
that the movement system would remain until the 2006 elections. With the limit of two terms 
for an elected president lifted in 2005, the NRM and Museveni ensured their win by using 
various unconventional methods, such as media control, obstacles for opposition parties, the 
increased role of the army and high levels of intimidation (Makara, et al., 2009. p.196). It was 
clear to Western donors that the election results were not fair. Just as in Kenya after the 1997 
elections, the donors agreed that the elections themselves were at least a democratic 
improvement and could also be considered as a small step in ‘the right direction’. Again, 
donors looked the other way and continued their aid (Makara et al., 2009. p.198). 
In 2009, the Western donor relationship with the government of Uganda changed 
completely. The Ugandan parliament passed a resolution that would make way for an anti-
homosexuality bill, which criminalized homosexual sex, even to the extent of the death 
penalty. The violation of homosexual rights, paired with growing discontent about the 
political situation in Uganda, alarmed the Western donors. Western donors threatened to 
reduce or even suspend their financial aid in Uganda if this bill was passed. In 2011, when 
David Cameron threatened to cut British aid to any country that was not respecting gay rights, 
Uganda accused them of neo-colonial behavior and of not respecting Uganda’s sovereignty 
(BCC, 2011). Uganda saw the bill as a way to protect the ‘African way of life’ against 
Western influences and Museveni used it to show Uganda's independence (Boyd, 2013. 
p.698). However, during the period of 2011–2014, the bill was amended by Parliament as a 
result of Western pressure and the death penalty was removed. Still, during this period, 
Western donor funding dropped by almost 15 percent (Among, 2014). 
In 2014, an anti-gay law was passed and allowed life imprisonment for ‘aggravated 
homosexuality’ (BBC, 2014). After the passing of the law, the Netherlands, Norway, and 
Denmark applied sanctions as promised. The Netherlands cut all the aid that helped financed 
the judicial sector and only continued funding NGOs or CSOs (Volkskrant, 2014). However. 
the EU and the US were again reluctant to reduce or suspend their aid. 
 
Effects 
In the 1990’s in Uganda, no sanctions were applied and aid was not reduced. The EU 
solely used forms of reward for the government's seeming willingness to implement reforms. 
However, one has to wonder whether the rewards used by the EU led to the actual democratic 
reforms. From the start, Museveni’s intentions seemed aimed at improving the human rights 
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situation and improving liberalization. Therefore, it is possible that the EU had very little 
influence on the political situation. Not once in 1986–2009 did the EU use forms of 
punishment to make the Ugandan government change its ways. Even though Uganda was and 
is very dependent on Western aid, other factors seemed to be more important than the 
improvement of the human rights situation. Only in 2014 did some EU countries try to force 
the government of Uganda to improve the human rights situation with negative forms of 
encouragements, such as reducing aid, but the results were small. The only real ‘positive’ 
change was that homosexuality was no longer punishable by death, but would ‘only’ lead to 
life imprisonment. It is safe to say that the withdrawal of aid in this case did not have the 
desired effect.  
The EU’s lack of punishment may also have had a negative impact on democratization 
process in Uganda, as the EU held back in their exertion of pressure when democratic reforms 
were needed. The EU found a stable economic situation and the need to keep Uganda’s 
reputation intact more important than democratic reforms. It is clear that the rigged 
constitution is one the major issues when it comes to liberalization and democratic reform. As 
long as a constitution ensures the rule of an authoritarian regime, actual democratic reform 
can never take place. This has been the case in both Kenya and Uganda It was only when the 
constitution was revisited in 2002 that a multiparty system could be formed. One could state 
that in 1994, the EU helped with the first steps towards this essential constitutional reform by 
promising more aid if their conditions were met. This can be seen as a positive long-term 
effect of positive conditionality.  
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5. The three criteria of political conditionality 
The main goal of political conditionality applied by the EU is to improve the human 
rights situation in a country. By adopting multiple policies of positive conditionality, the EU 
has tried to encourage countries to implement reforms. When the EU would adopt policies 
connected to negative conditionality, it used methods of punishment to ensure countries 
would not violate human rights. Conditionality clauses differed between one aid agreement to 
another, based on different criteria regarding the recipient country. The European Parliament 
has criticized the European Council’s inconsistency of political conditionality and the use of 
‘double standards’ (Bartels, 2008. pp.11-12). Donor countries use double standard to “pursue 
a number of interests in their relationship with recipients, of which concern for democracy 
and good governance is only two items of the list of priorities” (Sorensen, 1995. p. 393). 
Before the EU enters an aid agreement, they have to consider what type of conditionality 
would be most effective to reach their goal. The cases of Kenya and Uganda show that the 
effectiveness of political conditionality in the EU’s foreign policy, regardless of its form, is 
dependent on several criteria.  
The first criterion is based on the political situation in the target country. (Bartels, 
2008. p.12). The political situation of a country determines not only whether the government 
is willing to implement reforms, but also whether a country has the capacity, capabilities, and 
will to implement reforms. In Uganda, Museveni was in favor of democratic reforms and 
liberalization and very willing to work with EU donors. As Museveni had a positive attitude 
towards reforms, the EU saw no reason to reduce aid. The EU wanted to encourage the further 
implementation of democratic reforms and, therefore, used rewarding policies when 
conditions were met. In Kenya, President Moi had been ruling for almost 18 years and had no 
reason or willingness to implement reforms. The EU had to give him a real reason to change 
his ways. By imposing sanctions and threatening to reduce aid, the EU gave Moi no other 
choice than to implement those reforms, as Kenya was very dependent on EU aid. Also, the 
human rights violations in Kenya by the KANU were severe. According to Bartels, the EU 
does not necessarily respond to ‘mere’ human rights violations, but does act in situations 
where sudden, severe human rights violations take place (Bartels, 2008. p.12). This was the 
case in Kenya both before and after the elections of 1992 and 1997. To oppress the opposition, 
the Kenyan government severely violated basic human rights, which led to the immediate 
reduction of aid by European donors. 
The second criterion has to do with the relationship the donor has with the recipient 
country. The allocation of aid and the amount of aid given to developing countries is very 
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much dependent on the (economic) value that the developing country has to the donor country. 
Crawford (1997. p.84) states that “where bilateral relations are close, tied up with donors' own 
strategic or economic interests, then the effectiveness of aid conditionality is compromised by 
the weakness of measures implemented, or by their total absence”. The absence of 
repercussions by EU countries can be best explained by EU countries diplomatic and trade 
interests (Robinson, 1993. p.94). In the case of Uganda, it is clear that the EU considered their 
economic relations with Uganda a priority. Although the EU claimed to focus on the 
improvement of human rights, economic stability was key. Under Museveni’s rule, the 
economy was stable and a political uproar could lead to the destabilization of the entire 
country. Therefore, the main reason that the EU did not use sanctions or reduce any aid was 
because it was too afraid to damage the economic situation. Besides the economic benefits, 
Uganda was also the EU’s ‘success story’ and was used as an example for other African 
countries. If the EU used sanctions or any form of relocation or reduction of aid, it would no 
longer be able to use Uganda as a positive example. In Kenya, the economic situation was 
already unstable for a long time. Donors believed that political reform was needed to stabilize 
the economy (Robinson, 1993. pp.90-91). By using sanctions, they made sure that the basis of 
a multi-party system was established, as political stability was needed to eventually ensure 
economic stability. After 1992, the number of sanctions decreased. With a ‘stable’ regime in 
place, the economic stability of the state was now more important than human rights 
violations (Brown, 2007. p.317). The EU still tried to encourage the Kenyan government to 
continue democratic reforms and improve the human right situation, but only used positive 
forms of encouragements, as these would not endanger the economic stability.  
The third criterion is the domestic pressure exerted in the donor country (Dellepiane, 
et al., 2015. pp.6-7). As I outlined before, in the 1990’s, the improvement of human rights and 
the implementation of democratic reforms were seen as key elements of development, not 
only by EU governments but also by the public (Lister, 1997. p.151). During the Cold War, 
the establishment of democracy was top priority as it was seen as the only way to fight 
communism. As Uganda implemented reforms that were in line with democratic principles, it 
would be logical to assume that EU citizens regarded this as a positive change. No matter if 
this meant that the EU was still supporting the current authoritarian state, as happened in 
Uganda (Sorenson, 1995. p.393). It would also explain why the EU was so strict with the 
implementation of these principles in Kenya. Also, the severe violations of human rights in 
Kenya were often reported by European news networks. The EU would lose credibility with 
its citizens if they did not at least try to punish these violations. In Uganda, these sudden 
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outbursts of violence were also reported, but the EU often defended its lack of punishment by 
focusing on the democratic improvements that were made; for example, the small 
improvements of civil and political rights. As time passed, implementing democracy became 
less and less important and human rights violations became the key issues in the public 
opinion. The emancipation of minority groups is currently one of the most pressing issues. 
Therefore, it is not strange that the violation of gay rights in Uganda received a lot of attention. 
In the Netherlands, gay rights are a pressing issue and the Dutch government could not 
legitimize providing aid to a country that violated gay rights. Therefore, the suspension of all 
government aid was the only option. 
 
The EU was not always consistent in its application of conditionality and has lost a lot 
of its credibility. This can be observed in both Uganda and Kenya. Both President Moi and 
President Museveni realized that the EU was reluctant to reduce aid and used this to their 
advantage. The EU was afraid that reducing aid would lead to an unstable economic situation, 
which would affect the donor countries in a negative way. The destabilization of the economy 
would cause more harm to the poor than to the government. The ‘double-standards’ of EU aid 
conditionality were, therefore, not always bad (Lister, 1997. P.153). If the transition to a 
democratic environment is done to fast or in a way that is not suited for the recipient country, 
the transition itself can lead to instability and create a worse human rights situation than 
before (Sorenson, 1995. p.407). However, human rights concerns are not the only concerns of 
a donor country. The three criteria show that political and economic concerns, paired with 
domestic pressure, shape the behavior of a donor country. The EU’s inconsistency also means 
that they are flexible in their policies. The use of positive measures might, in some cases, have 
more effect than the use of negative measures. Economic benefits and a stable political 
environment, no matter which principles they’re based on, were key to the EU. Flexibility, 
therefore, is favorable in situations like Uganda. While Uganda still had cases of human rights 
violations, the overall human right situation was improving; the government was willing to 
implement democratic reforms and Museveni ensured economic stability. If the donor 
countries had only focused on the small negatives, i.e., the human rights violations, the 
situation in Uganda would probably have deteriorated. In Kenya, it was essential for the donor 
countries to interfere and apply negative measures. The severe and sudden human rights 
violations, as explained in the first criterion, forced the EU to act. The overall situation in 
Kenya was deteriorating. There was no ‘worsening’ the situation by using negative methods, 
as there was no stability or willingness to implement democratic reforms. I therefore wonder 
21 
 
whether the EU application of conditionality is as inconsistent as some state. If a country 
shows promise and positive change and has a stable economy, the EU tends to be more 
supportive and more lenient than if a country does not show any improvements or even the 
willingness to improve. 
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6. Discussion   
It is almost impossible to deduce what the actual effects of adopted conditionality policies 
are. Some reforms are the direct result of agreements laced with political conditionality, such 
as the elections in Kenya. However, the democratization process of a country is also 
dependent on many other factors. The formation of a civil society, the presence of NGO’s and 
CVO’s, and economic development are all factors that influence the democratization process. 
The major problem is these conditions are different in every country and thus influence the 
democratization process and support the reforms made by political conditionality in different 
ways. It is important to realize that this analysis is only based on the cases of Kenya and 
Uganda and thus not applicable in all cases. It is possible that in other developing countries, 
the EU's aid conditionality had a very different impact. The external validity of this study is, 
therefore, quite low.  
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7. Conclusion  
In Kenya, some of the direct, short-term impacts of the conditionality used are clear, 
such as the implementation of a multi-party system. However, the implementation of the 
multi-party system was merely symbolic. The elections may have constituted a first step in the 
liberalization process, but it is hard to tell whether this exertion of pressure by donors 
contributed to any real improvement (van Cranenburgh, 1995. p.46). However, “political 
conditionality is likely to have a greater impact at specific point in the transition process, at 
the early stages of political liberalization rather than as a key factor in sustained 
democratization” (Robinson, 1993. p.92). Although the multi-party system started as a 
symbolic measure, it did lay out a foundation for a civil society. The existence of (organized) 
opposition and the presence of NGO’s are both very important in shaping the civil society of a 
country. Supporting these organizations and the opposition, helped Kenya take its first steps 
towards political liberalization (Crawford, 1997. p.83). As political conditionality laid the 
foundation for the existence of the political opposition, one can regard the use of political 
conditionality by donors to have a positive long-term effect. In Uganda, mostly because the 
use of political conditionality was very inconsistent, it is more of a guessing game when 
analyzing what effect political conditionality policies had. The promise of benefits by EU 
donors contributed to the constitutional reform in Uganda, but so did internal pressure from 
ethnic groups and NGOs. Both played key roles in the process of constitutional reform.  
The effectiveness of political conditionality is impacted by the flexibility with which it 
is applied. Reducing aid in one country while continuing aid in another, when the human 
rights violations may be similar, influences the credibility of the donors. In Kenya, the 
inconsistency of EU donors affected their credibility and, as time passed, led to the Kenyan 
government taking EU threats less seriously. Likewise, Museveni soon realized that Uganda 
had a favorable position in EU policies and used this to his advantage. Where other African 
governments were punished, he was merely warned and allowed to continue his rule as long 
as he accepted minor concessions and ensured economic growth. It is essential that the threat 
to withdraw aid be credible, otherwise it will not be effective (Dunning, 2004. p.422). 
Political conditionality only helps to advance the implementation of EU human rights 
policies to some extent. By supporting economic growth and political reforms, the EU has 
helped to improve the human rights situation in Kenya and Uganda. The reduction or 
suspension of aid seems to only have been effective at the beginning of the 1990’s and even 
then, the effect seems to be minimal. Political conditionality, especially when used negatively, 
has become less effective in the international system. As donor countries are now reluctant to 
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reduce aid, they no longer have the credibility to threaten third world countries to achieve 
their desired effects. Also, most third world countries are no longer dependent on just the 
Western donors and have found alternatives (non-western donors) to turn to when they do not 
agree with the set conditions. A positive and rewarding attitude seems to have more effect, as 
it either lures a third world country into an agreement or gives them an incentive to implement 
reforms, while respecting their sovereignty.  
As negative conditionality is used less and less, further research should focus on the 
effectiveness of positive political conditionality. This research should be used to figure out 
which types of positive conditionality create the right incentives for developing countries to 
implement the whished reforms. Also, there should be further research conducted about the 
different donor options for development countries. The role of non-western countries, such as 
China, is becoming more prominent in the world. It should be investigated in what way the 
political conditions tied to these countries aid differ from the conditions set by European 
donor countries. This will provide a more detailed guide on the effectiveness of political 
conditionality and how it should be used in this day and age to help advance the 
implementation of EU human rights policies.  
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